1. Super Freak - Rick James (*)
2. Let's Groove - Earth, Wind and Fire (*)
3. Just the Two of Us - Grover Washington Jr & Bill Withers
4. Celebration - Kool and The Gang (*)
5. Jessie's Girl - Rick Springfield (**)
6. Don't Stop Believin' - Journey
7. Endless Love - Lionel Ritchie and Diana Ross
8. Give It To Me Baby - Rick James (**)
9. Back In Black - AC/DC
10. Same Old Lang Syne - Dan Fogelberg
11. I Love You - Climax Blues Band
12. Lady (You Bring Me Up) - Commodores
13. She's A Bad Mama Jama (She's Built, She's Stacked) - Carl Carlton
14. America - Neil Diamond
15. Fantastic Voyage - Lakeside
16. Start Me Up - Rolling Stones
17. In The Air Tonight - Phi Collins
18. Double Dutch Bus - Frankie Smith
19. Hey Nineteen - Steely Dan
20. We're in This Love Together - Al Jarreau
21. De Do Do Do, De Da Da Da - Police
22. Woman - John Lennon
23. Waiting For A Girl Like You - Foreigner (**)
24. Love T.K.O. - Teddy Pendergast
25. Urgent - Foreigner (***)
26. Fire and Ice - Pat Benatar
27. Being With You - Smokey Robinson
28. The Tide Is High - Blondie (**)
29. Don't Stand So Close To Me - Police
30. Tempted - Squeeze (*)
31. Treat Me Right - Pat Benatar
32. Our Lips Are Sealed - Go Go's (*)
33. Burn Rubber (Why You Wanna Hurt Me) - Gap Band
34. Who's Making Love - Blues Brothers
35. Guilty - Barbra Streisand and Barry Gibb (*)
36. Winner Takes All - Abba
37. Queen of Hearts - Juice Newton
38. Controversy - Prince
39. The Stroke - Billy Squier
40. Watching the Wheels - John Lennon
41. Say Goodbye to Hollywood - Billy Joel
42. Fashion - David Bowie (***)
43. My Girl (Gone, Gone, Gone) - Chilliwack
44. No Reply At All - Genesis
45. The Old Songs - Barry Manilow
46. All Those Years Ago - George Harrison
47. Slow Hand - Pointer Sisters
48. 8th Wonder - Sugarhill Gang
49. Every Little Thing She Does Is Magic - Police (*)
50. Winning - Santana
51. Rapture - Blondie (***)
52. Jones vs. Jones - Kool and the Gang
53. 9 to 5 - Dolly Parton
54. Tom Saywer - Rush
55. Elvira - Oak Ridge Boys
56. Private Eyes - Hall and Oates
57. (Ghost) Riders In The Sky - The Outlaws
58. Working in the Coal Mine - Devo
59. Keep on Loving You - REO Speedwagon
60. Super Trooper - Abba
61. Physical - Olivia Newton John (**)
62. Wasn't That a Party - The Rovers
63. Ah! Leah - Donnie Iris
64. Arc of a Diver - Steve Winwood
65. While You See a Chance - Steve Winwood
66. Teacher, Teacher - Rockpile (***)
67. Hello Again - Neil Diamond
68. Skateaway - Dire Straites
69. Sukiyaki - A Taste Of Honey
70. Sign of the Gypsy Queen - April Wine
71. (There's) No Getting Over Me - Ronnie Milsap
72. All American Girls - Sister Sledge
73. Boy from New York City - Manhattan Transfer
74. Morning Train (9 to 5) - Sheena Easton
75. This Little Girl - Gary U.S. Bonds
Tuesday, November 28, 2006
Monday, November 27, 2006
Reading
"Are Women Human?" Catharine MacKinnon
"Koba the Dread" Martin Amis
"The Saga of the Volsungs"
"Koba the Dread" Martin Amis
"The Saga of the Volsungs"
Wednesday, November 22, 2006
S is for Q
What horrible Edward Gorey Death will you die? |
 You will sink in a mire. You like to think you're normal, but deep down you really just want to strip off your clothes and roll around in chicken fat. Take this quiz!  Quizilla | Join | Make A Quiz | More Quizzes | Grab Code |
Friday, November 17, 2006
Noam Shalit
An Israeli soldier named Gilad Shalit was captured on the twenty-fifth of June by a Palestinian group operating in Israel. Yesterday Gilad's father Noam visited Palestinian victims of Israeli shelling in a Tel Aviv hospital to express his sympathy and repeat his request that negotiations for his son's release move forward. A soldier is not the same as a civilian, certainly, but Noam Shalit's act is deeply humane and I was very moved by this story.
Wednesday, November 15, 2006
Reading
"Scoop" Evelyn Waugh
"Machiavellian Intelligence" many evolutionary biologists
"Coriolanus" William Shakespeare
"Machiavellian Intelligence" many evolutionary biologists
"Coriolanus" William Shakespeare
Odor
I suppose fingerprints and armpits. Shouldn't we all have distinct odors? To hear a bloodhound tell it, we do. But I have been sniffing people for the past couple of weeks and, though I've been complimented by pros for my finetuned nose, I can't smell much at all at such moments. A woman in my office smells like the shavings in a hamster cage and another smelled vaguely nice today, but the first may be a result of her upholstery and the second could be hormonal. Not to be confused with pheremonal. I definitely have a scent--Eames calls it musk. But to be a proper officeworker I've subdued it. I sniffed my shirt today: I've worn it two days running and it barely speaks my name. I love my scent and that of a few others. I want to know more people's scents. I am without fear.
Monday, November 13, 2006
Reference
The New York Public Library telephone reference desk. Every day, except Sundays and holidays, between 9 a.m. and 6 p.m. Eastern Standard Time, anyone, of any age, from anywhere in the world, can telephone 212-340-0849 and ask a question. The library staff will not answer crossword or contest questions, do children's homework, or answer philosophical speculations.
Isn't that neat?
Isn't that neat?
Wednesday, November 08, 2006
Robert M. Gates-scummier
From the New York Times, Nov. 4, 1991
Mr. Gates' Past, The C.I.A.'s Future
When the Senate votes tomorrow on the nomination of Robert Gates, it will be judging more than his fitness to lead the Central Intelligence Agency out of the past. It will be judging its own fitness to oversee intelligence.
The confirmation hearings did little to dispel doubts that Mr. Gates misled Congress during the Iran-contra scandal. They reinforced suspicions that he tailored intelligence estimates to please his superiors. And they raised questions about his role during the Iran-Iraq war.
Even so, the Senate Intelligence Committee chose to give Mr. Gates the benefit of the doubt, voting 11 to 4 in favor of confirmation. That vote sends and unfortunate message: Instead of overseeing intelligence, the Committee chose to look the other way. Now it's up to the Senate to confront Mr. Gates's past and say he's not fit to lead the C.I.A. into the future.
The Iran-contra question is simple. Did Mr. Gates know about the illegal diversion of proceeds from arms sales to Iran to the Nicaraguan contras? In 1985 and again in 1987, he told Congress he knew nothing about it. He clings to his story--despite evidence that he was warned about it in some detail by subordinates.
Charges that Mr. Gates slanted intelligence assessments, leaving Congress in the dark and more amenable to Administration policy, stand unrefuted. He now acknowledges suppressing dissent to a 1985 intelligence estimate justifying the covert sale of arms to Iran.
Then, when he was accused of `killing' estimates that showed waning Soviet activity in the third world, he obliquely acknowledged that he `may have found a specific paper inadequate.'
Further, Mr. Gates distributed an assessment making the case for Soviet complicity in the attempted assassination of Pope John Paul II and endorsed it, enthusiastically, as `the C.I.A.'s first comprehensive examination' of the issue. A C.I.A. post-mortem found that `no one at the working level other than the two primary authors of the paper * * * agreed with [its] thrust.'
The hearings left another question dangling: did Mr. Gates play a role in suspected intelligence-sharing and arms transfers with Iraq? The C.I.A., the committee concludes, shared vital intelligence with Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war and failed to report it to Congressional intelligence committees, as required by law.
A related question, let unanswered and still troubling to some senators, was whether the C.I.A., which is supposed to monitor suspicious arms deals, looked the other way while U.S. companies unlawfully armed Iraq as well as Iran.
All three reservations about Mr. Gates--his denying knowledge of Iran-contra, slanting intelligence and winking at reporting requirements--suggest that he is a man used to doing business the old way. Yet a new era requires new ways. The Senate would mortgage the C.I.A.'s future to its past and deny Congress's constitutional role of oversight if it confirmed Mr. Gates as C.I.A. director.
Mr. Gates' Past, The C.I.A.'s Future
When the Senate votes tomorrow on the nomination of Robert Gates, it will be judging more than his fitness to lead the Central Intelligence Agency out of the past. It will be judging its own fitness to oversee intelligence.
The confirmation hearings did little to dispel doubts that Mr. Gates misled Congress during the Iran-contra scandal. They reinforced suspicions that he tailored intelligence estimates to please his superiors. And they raised questions about his role during the Iran-Iraq war.
Even so, the Senate Intelligence Committee chose to give Mr. Gates the benefit of the doubt, voting 11 to 4 in favor of confirmation. That vote sends and unfortunate message: Instead of overseeing intelligence, the Committee chose to look the other way. Now it's up to the Senate to confront Mr. Gates's past and say he's not fit to lead the C.I.A. into the future.
The Iran-contra question is simple. Did Mr. Gates know about the illegal diversion of proceeds from arms sales to Iran to the Nicaraguan contras? In 1985 and again in 1987, he told Congress he knew nothing about it. He clings to his story--despite evidence that he was warned about it in some detail by subordinates.
Charges that Mr. Gates slanted intelligence assessments, leaving Congress in the dark and more amenable to Administration policy, stand unrefuted. He now acknowledges suppressing dissent to a 1985 intelligence estimate justifying the covert sale of arms to Iran.
Then, when he was accused of `killing' estimates that showed waning Soviet activity in the third world, he obliquely acknowledged that he `may have found a specific paper inadequate.'
Further, Mr. Gates distributed an assessment making the case for Soviet complicity in the attempted assassination of Pope John Paul II and endorsed it, enthusiastically, as `the C.I.A.'s first comprehensive examination' of the issue. A C.I.A. post-mortem found that `no one at the working level other than the two primary authors of the paper * * * agreed with [its] thrust.'
The hearings left another question dangling: did Mr. Gates play a role in suspected intelligence-sharing and arms transfers with Iraq? The C.I.A., the committee concludes, shared vital intelligence with Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war and failed to report it to Congressional intelligence committees, as required by law.
A related question, let unanswered and still troubling to some senators, was whether the C.I.A., which is supposed to monitor suspicious arms deals, looked the other way while U.S. companies unlawfully armed Iraq as well as Iran.
All three reservations about Mr. Gates--his denying knowledge of Iran-contra, slanting intelligence and winking at reporting requirements--suggest that he is a man used to doing business the old way. Yet a new era requires new ways. The Senate would mortgage the C.I.A.'s future to its past and deny Congress's constitutional role of oversight if it confirmed Mr. Gates as C.I.A. director.
Robert M. Gates-scum
GATES NOMINATION (Senate - November 07, 1991)
[Page: S16305]
[Begin insert]
SENATOR TOM HARKIN. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the nomination of Robert Gates to be Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Mr. President, at the outset of the confirmation hearings, I had serious reservations about the nominee. The confirmation hearings only raised more questions and greater doubts. Questions and doubts about Mr. Gates' past activities, managerial style, judgment, lapses in memory and analytical abilities. Questions and doubts about his role in the Iran-Contra Affair and in providing military intelligence to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war; and questions and doubts about whether he will be able to remove the ideological blinders reflected in his writings and speeches or whether Mr. Gates is so rooted in the past, that he will not be able to lead the Agency into the post-cold war era. Because of these concerns, I have concluded that Mr. Gates is not the right person for the important job of overseeing our intelligence operations in this New World.
Mr. President, Robert Gates is a career Soviet analyst and former Deputy Director of the CIA who was wrong about what CIA analyst Harold Ford described as `the central analytic target of the past few years: the probable fortunes of the USSR and the Soviet European bloc.' And I believe that the committee report points out one possible reason why the CIA failed to predict the collapse of the Soviet Union. According to testimony, Mr. Gates was busy pursuing hypotheses and making unsubstantiated arguments attempting to show Soviet expansion in the Third World, instead of looking for or paying attention to facts that pointed in the opposite direction. Why? Why, as Mentor Moynihan has pointed out, was the CIA able to tell Presidents everything about the Soviet Union except the fact that it was falling apart?
Mr. Gates was also wrong about the Soviet threat to Iran in 1985. The 1985 Special National Intelligence Estimate on Iran stressed possible Soviet inroads into Iran. Gates admits that the analysis was an anomaly. It was a clear departure from previous analyses and almost immediately proven wrong by subsequent events. Gates was involved in preparing that analysis. According to Hal Ford, whose testimony the nominee never refuted, Gates leaned heavily on the Iran Estimate, in effect, `insisting on his own views and discouraging dissent.' What was the result? The 1985 estimate was skewed and contributed to the biggest foreign policy debacle of the Reagan administration, the sale of arms to Iran.
Mr. President, Graham Fuller, the CIA's National Intelligence Officer for the Near East, suggested that the 1985 SNIE estimate was based on intuition in the absence of hard evidence. I agree there is nothing wrong with preparing worse case scenarios or using `intuition' as opposed to hard evidence in the preparation of analysis, provided it is made clear to policymakers that the finished analysis is based on intuition and not hard evidence. It is the job of the CIA to sort out fact from fiction, not convert one into the other.
Mr. President, I also have doubts and questions about Mr. Gates' role in the secret intelligence sharing operation with Iraq. Robert Gates served as assistant to the Director of the CIA in 1981 and as Deputy Director for Intelligence for 1982 to 1986. In that capacity he helped develop options in dealing with the Iran-Iraq war, which eventually involved into a secret intelligence liaison relationship with Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Gates was in charge of the directorate that prepared the intelligence information that was passed on to Iraq. He testified that he was also an active participant in the operation during 1986. The secret intelligence sharing operation with Iraq was not only a highly questionable and possibly illegal operation, but also may have jeopardized American lives and our national interests. The photo reconnaissance, highly sensitive electronic eavesdropping and narrative texts provided to Saddam, may not only have helped him in Iraq's war against Iran but also in the recent gulf war. Saddam Hussein may have discovered the value of underground land lines as opposed to radio communications after he was give our intelligence information. That made it more difficult for the allied coalition to get quick and accurate intelligence during the gulf war. Further, after the Persian Gulf war, our intelligence community was surprised at the extent of Iraq's nuclear program. One reason Saddam may have hidden his nuclear program so effectively from detection was because of his knowledge of our satellite photos. What also concerns me about that operation is that we spend millions of dollars keeping secrets from the Soviets and then we give it to Saddam who sells them to the Soviets. In short, the coddling of Saddam was a mistake of the first order.
Mr. President, I've stated a very simple case for rejecting the nomination of Robert Gates to be Director of the CIA. The fact that he was wrong on major issues which in some instances led to foreign policy debacles. I haven't addressed concerns about the allegations of his politicization of intelligence analysis, his apparently poor managerial style or still unanswered questions about his role in the Iran-Contra affair. Regarding the Iran-Contra affair, I should mention that I was quite disturbed to hear testimony that portrayed Robert Gates as someone concerned about Agency's role and not sufficiently concerned about pursuing possible illegal Government activities. In his opening statement before the Intelligence Committee, Mr. Gates said that he should have taken more seriously `the possibility of impropriety or possible wrongdoing in the Government and pursued this possibility more aggressively.' I agree.
I should also mention, Mr. President, that aside from Mr. Gates' poor judgment in not pursuing the possibility of Government wrongdoing more aggressively, I still find it incredible that the Deputy Director of CIA was not aware of that major covert operation. How could such a high ranking official not know about the CIA's efforts to support the Contras? Did he purposely avoid trying to find out what was happening? The testimony seemed to indicate he did. Gates' selective lapses in recall about the affair by a man with a photographic memory raises serious doubts.
The U.S. Congress and the American people depend on accurate and reliable intelligence information. Our expenditures on defense and other areas are often decided on the basis of that information. We cannot afford to waste billion of dollars in the future. After reviewing the record, I do not believe that the Central Intelligence Agency under the directorship of Robert Gates will provide the clear intelligence assessments necessary for Congress to make decisions to deal with the future threats confronting our nation.
Mr. President, I do not believe that Robert Gates is the right person to lead the CIA at this time. The cold war is over and it's time for some of the old warriors to rest. Now we must take a fresh new look at the world, think new thoughts and reassess the future role of the intelligence community. I urge my colleagues to vote against Robert Gates.
[Page: S16305]
[Begin insert]
SENATOR TOM HARKIN. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the nomination of Robert Gates to be Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Mr. President, at the outset of the confirmation hearings, I had serious reservations about the nominee. The confirmation hearings only raised more questions and greater doubts. Questions and doubts about Mr. Gates' past activities, managerial style, judgment, lapses in memory and analytical abilities. Questions and doubts about his role in the Iran-Contra Affair and in providing military intelligence to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war; and questions and doubts about whether he will be able to remove the ideological blinders reflected in his writings and speeches or whether Mr. Gates is so rooted in the past, that he will not be able to lead the Agency into the post-cold war era. Because of these concerns, I have concluded that Mr. Gates is not the right person for the important job of overseeing our intelligence operations in this New World.
Mr. President, Robert Gates is a career Soviet analyst and former Deputy Director of the CIA who was wrong about what CIA analyst Harold Ford described as `the central analytic target of the past few years: the probable fortunes of the USSR and the Soviet European bloc.' And I believe that the committee report points out one possible reason why the CIA failed to predict the collapse of the Soviet Union. According to testimony, Mr. Gates was busy pursuing hypotheses and making unsubstantiated arguments attempting to show Soviet expansion in the Third World, instead of looking for or paying attention to facts that pointed in the opposite direction. Why? Why, as Mentor Moynihan has pointed out, was the CIA able to tell Presidents everything about the Soviet Union except the fact that it was falling apart?
Mr. Gates was also wrong about the Soviet threat to Iran in 1985. The 1985 Special National Intelligence Estimate on Iran stressed possible Soviet inroads into Iran. Gates admits that the analysis was an anomaly. It was a clear departure from previous analyses and almost immediately proven wrong by subsequent events. Gates was involved in preparing that analysis. According to Hal Ford, whose testimony the nominee never refuted, Gates leaned heavily on the Iran Estimate, in effect, `insisting on his own views and discouraging dissent.' What was the result? The 1985 estimate was skewed and contributed to the biggest foreign policy debacle of the Reagan administration, the sale of arms to Iran.
Mr. President, Graham Fuller, the CIA's National Intelligence Officer for the Near East, suggested that the 1985 SNIE estimate was based on intuition in the absence of hard evidence. I agree there is nothing wrong with preparing worse case scenarios or using `intuition' as opposed to hard evidence in the preparation of analysis, provided it is made clear to policymakers that the finished analysis is based on intuition and not hard evidence. It is the job of the CIA to sort out fact from fiction, not convert one into the other.
Mr. President, I also have doubts and questions about Mr. Gates' role in the secret intelligence sharing operation with Iraq. Robert Gates served as assistant to the Director of the CIA in 1981 and as Deputy Director for Intelligence for 1982 to 1986. In that capacity he helped develop options in dealing with the Iran-Iraq war, which eventually involved into a secret intelligence liaison relationship with Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Gates was in charge of the directorate that prepared the intelligence information that was passed on to Iraq. He testified that he was also an active participant in the operation during 1986. The secret intelligence sharing operation with Iraq was not only a highly questionable and possibly illegal operation, but also may have jeopardized American lives and our national interests. The photo reconnaissance, highly sensitive electronic eavesdropping and narrative texts provided to Saddam, may not only have helped him in Iraq's war against Iran but also in the recent gulf war. Saddam Hussein may have discovered the value of underground land lines as opposed to radio communications after he was give our intelligence information. That made it more difficult for the allied coalition to get quick and accurate intelligence during the gulf war. Further, after the Persian Gulf war, our intelligence community was surprised at the extent of Iraq's nuclear program. One reason Saddam may have hidden his nuclear program so effectively from detection was because of his knowledge of our satellite photos. What also concerns me about that operation is that we spend millions of dollars keeping secrets from the Soviets and then we give it to Saddam who sells them to the Soviets. In short, the coddling of Saddam was a mistake of the first order.
Mr. President, I've stated a very simple case for rejecting the nomination of Robert Gates to be Director of the CIA. The fact that he was wrong on major issues which in some instances led to foreign policy debacles. I haven't addressed concerns about the allegations of his politicization of intelligence analysis, his apparently poor managerial style or still unanswered questions about his role in the Iran-Contra affair. Regarding the Iran-Contra affair, I should mention that I was quite disturbed to hear testimony that portrayed Robert Gates as someone concerned about Agency's role and not sufficiently concerned about pursuing possible illegal Government activities. In his opening statement before the Intelligence Committee, Mr. Gates said that he should have taken more seriously `the possibility of impropriety or possible wrongdoing in the Government and pursued this possibility more aggressively.' I agree.
I should also mention, Mr. President, that aside from Mr. Gates' poor judgment in not pursuing the possibility of Government wrongdoing more aggressively, I still find it incredible that the Deputy Director of CIA was not aware of that major covert operation. How could such a high ranking official not know about the CIA's efforts to support the Contras? Did he purposely avoid trying to find out what was happening? The testimony seemed to indicate he did. Gates' selective lapses in recall about the affair by a man with a photographic memory raises serious doubts.
The U.S. Congress and the American people depend on accurate and reliable intelligence information. Our expenditures on defense and other areas are often decided on the basis of that information. We cannot afford to waste billion of dollars in the future. After reviewing the record, I do not believe that the Central Intelligence Agency under the directorship of Robert Gates will provide the clear intelligence assessments necessary for Congress to make decisions to deal with the future threats confronting our nation.
Mr. President, I do not believe that Robert Gates is the right person to lead the CIA at this time. The cold war is over and it's time for some of the old warriors to rest. Now we must take a fresh new look at the world, think new thoughts and reassess the future role of the intelligence community. I urge my colleagues to vote against Robert Gates.
Life's cruelest blows
The adoption of the unprecedented policy of banning short trousers from Kiss (Taipei's Super Disco) some time between fall 1988 and summer 1996.
The closing of Hermann's Salads on Geary Boulevard between Sixth and Seventh Avenues, replaced by a Gap.
The death of Midnight.
The destruction of the Embarcadero Freeway.
Various romantic disappointments.
The closing of Playland by the Sea.
Whiskers.
"Remain in Light"
The time I had to siphon shark shit out of a large tank at Steinhart.
The closing of Hermann's Salads on Geary Boulevard between Sixth and Seventh Avenues, replaced by a Gap.
The death of Midnight.
The destruction of the Embarcadero Freeway.
Various romantic disappointments.
The closing of Playland by the Sea.
Whiskers.
"Remain in Light"
The time I had to siphon shark shit out of a large tank at Steinhart.
Monday, November 06, 2006
Why life is wonderful
There are so many things to dislike! Waking up each day, I know that my life has purpose because I will discover new things to bitch about. Here's today's: the phrase "grace with -- presence." It's now on the banned and forbidden list.
Thursday, November 02, 2006
Reading
"The Autograph Man" Zadie Smith
"A Social History of Truth" Steven Shapin
"Le chef-d'oeuvre inconnu" Honoré de Balzac
"Runaway Slaves" John Hope Franklin & Loren Schweninger
"Dionysos at Large" Marcel Detienne
"A Social History of Truth" Steven Shapin
"Le chef-d'oeuvre inconnu" Honoré de Balzac
"Runaway Slaves" John Hope Franklin & Loren Schweninger
"Dionysos at Large" Marcel Detienne
Wednesday, November 01, 2006
Unclothed
Yesterday I removed a good portion of my hair to play the part of Magwitch more thoroughly. This morning I scraped off the remainder. I feel so very naked.
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